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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
133. State statutes imposing a license tax on soft drink retailers have
been upheld. Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1928) 147
S. C. 116, 144 S. E. 846. It is true that ordinances requiring a license for
persons in certain occupations have at times been declared invalid, but
such holdings seem to be based upon a specific conflict with statutory pro-
visions or else qualified by the particular circumstances in issue. City of
Lubbock v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 80; Case-
Fowler Lumber Co. v. Winslett (Ga. 1929) 149 S. E. 211; People W.
Hervieux (App. Div. 1929) 236 N. Y. S. 129. C. V. E., '31.
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION IN ADVERTISING AGREEMENTS.-
An advertising agency entered into three "contracts" with a publisher
whereby the latter was authorized to publish certain advertising matter in
its three newspapers. The space was to be used in one year from the date
of the first insertion and to be paid for at a stated price. Both parties
properly signed the "contracts." The agency never did furnish the copy
and there was no first insertion. The publisher sued for damages for
failure to perform. Held, that defendant, the advertising agency, was not
required to make such insertion, was not bound by the "contracts," and that
the so-called contracts could not be enforced for want of mutuality. All
Church Press, Inc. v. E. C. Harris Advertising Agency, Inc. (1927) 36 Ga.
App. 616, 138 S. E. 85
Mutuality of obligation is not an essential element in every contract
since a promise by one person is merely one of the kinds of consideration
that will support a promise by another. 6 R. C. L. 686, sec. 93. But where
there is no consideration for a contract except the mutual promises of
parties, the contract is not binding on one party unless it is also binding
on the other. Pope v. Thompson (1920) 171 Wis. 468, 177 N. W. 607;
Bernstein v. W. B. Mfg. Co. (1920) 235 Mass. 425, 126 N. E. 796; Miami
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1923) 291 F.
102; 1 Williston, CONTRACTS (1920), sec. 103e. Here the only possible con-
sideration to support the promise of the publisher was a binding promise
on the part of the advertising agency. But there was no such express
promise in writing, and the court failed to find any grounds for implying
one. The reasoning of the court is sound and certainly from the stand-
point of the substantive law of contracts there is nothing startling about
the decision. The case is followed by Haverty Furniture Co. v. Lyon-Young
Printing Co. (1927) 37 Ga. App. 263, 139 S. E. 921.
The unenforceable "contracts" involved in the main case are thoroughly
typical of advertising agreements being entered into every day. They were
drawn without any regard to the incorporation of mutually binding prom-
ises, and they illustrate perfectly the "mutuality pitfall" which renders
such agreements unenforceable. Though many details were provided for
in the agreement it contained no binding promise on defendant to do any-
thing. Publishers in particular should be interested to know that courts
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will not enforce such "contracts," and as a warning of this fact the case
is important. There is no question of policy sufficient to justify extending
contract principles to protect parties from a trap which they themselves
create. The parties who enter into such agreements need only look well
to the drawing thereof and be sure that there are obligations mutually
binding so that the contract will be enforceable. B. L. W., '31.
CRIMINAL LIBEL--INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN MEANING OF
LIBELOUS STATEMENT.-Defendant was prosecuted for criminal libel based
on a placard paraded by him in front of the Massachusetts State House
bearing the words, "Fuller-Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti." Held, that
a directed verdict for the defendant was properly refused, since the words
taken in their usual and popular sense import a charge of murder and are
libelous per se. Testimony that the words on the placard were used to
charge only moral responsibility was held properly rejected. Common-
wealth v. Canter (Mass. 1930) 168 N. E. 790.
Certain publications are said to be actionable per se and may be made
the occasion of criminal prosecution-by this is meant that an action will
lie for making them without proof of actual injury because their necessary
consequence would be to cause injury to the person of whom they are
spoken, and therefore injury is to be presumed. Words are to be taken in
that sense in which they would be understood by those who heard or read
them-in other words, it is a question of the natural and obvious meaning
of the words used. Ingalls v. Morrissey (1913) 154 Wis. 632, 143 N. W.
681; Pollard v. Lyon (1875) 91 U. S. 225, 308; Ogden v. Riley (1833) 14
N. J. L. 186.
Words which are apparently actionable in themselves may be rendered
not actionable by the surrounding circumstances. Yakoviche v. Valen-
tukevicius (1911) 84 Conn. 350, 80 Atl. 94. The question is how would
ordinary men of reasonable prudence naturally understand the language.
Herringer v. Ingberg (1903) 91 Minn. 71, 97 N. W. 460. Thus Shakes-
peare has said, "A jest's prosperity lies in the ears of him who hears it."
However positive may be the charge, if it is accompanied by words which
qualify the meaning and show to the bystanders that the act imputed is
not criminal, this is no slander since the charge, taken altogether, does not
convey to the minds of those who hear it an imputation of criminal con-
duct. Brown v. Meyers (1883) 40 Ohio St. 99. This doctrine has led to
many broader extensions. In Bridgeman v. Armer (1894) 57 Mo. A. 528,
it was held that if it appears that the words were used as a mere term of
abuse, and there was in point of fact no imputation of actual theft con-
veyed thereby, there is no cause of action. See also Haynes v. Haynes
(1848) 29 Me. 247; Fawsett v. Clark (1878) 48 Md. 494.
Some jurisdictions seem to cling to a stricter doctrine. The guilt of a
person must be determined by the article itself and the meaning that would
naturally be attributed to the words used therein, whether the hearers be-
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